Philosophy 955, Seminar #2, January 27, 2009 Rawls and egalitarianism

  • Context and Rawls's goals
    • Formulate a viable alternative to utilitarianism that respects individual separateness; secures individual rights
    • Social contract tradition: justice as reciprocity among equals
      • Distinguish "reciprocity", "impartiality", and "mutual advantage"
      • Veil of ignorance and "original position"
    • "The basic structure"
      • A distinct and crucial subject
      • Special -- constrained by no prior moral principles – sets the background for other inquiries
    • A "political conception" of justice – "reasonable pluralism" and "neutrality"
  • "Equals"
    • Those who possess the two "moral powers"
      • A capacity for a "sense of justice"
      • A capacity to commit to a comprehensive view of the good
    • Not all humans possess the two moral powers – limits to the inquiry
  • Rawls' two principles (as revised in Justice as Fairness, pp. 42-3)
    • Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberty for all; and
    • Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
    • (Initially criticized as anti-egalitarian; now far in left field with respect to our political culture, though not with respect to the literature on egalitarianism)
  • Two equalities plus the semi-egalitarian (fraternal) difference principle
    • Equal basic liberties
    • Fair equality of opportunity
      • Offices and positions open to all
      • Probability of attaining should depend only on talent, ambition, character, etc.
        • Contrast with "formal equality of opportunity"
        • Unattainable without disrupting the family
      • Inequalities in opportunity that are not addressed?
    • The difference principle
      • The "least advantaged" not a rigid designator
      • Leximin extension
      • Why the focus on the least advantaged?
  • Some crucial intricacies
    • (Social) primary goods rather than welfare as the metric
      • Instrumental to whatever one wants – a compromise (?)
      • Prerequisites for the exercise of the two moral powers
      • Simplifies interpersonal comparison
      • Needed to make sense of choice in original position
    • Representative, not actual individuals
      • Representative of what?
      • Critique of an "allocative" view of justice
      • Pure procedural justice
    • Desert
      • Intrinsic moral desert (rule determining) – irrelevant
      • Rule-dependent desert – defining entitlements
    • The difference principle as governing the establishment of entitlements and distribution, not mainly redistribution
  • The full second principle and what people deserve
    • People don't deserve the social advantages their family and community provide – and so(?) attempt to equalize these
    • People don't deserve their talents and character
      • Hard to equalize these
      • Better not to harness them for everyone's advantage
      • Talents as a "common asset"
        • In designing the principles of justice
        • In allocating goods
  • Rawls' argument for the two principle as compared with utilitarianism
    • Protection of liberty and a sort of equality
    • No sacrifice of one individual for the good of others
    • Focus on primary goods solves indeterminacies and consistent with a political view of justice
  • Is there a specifically egalitarian case to be made for or against Rawls?