Sen on Equality of Capabilities
Stewart Eskew, March 10, 2009
- Equality of Basic Capabilities.
- What’s the view?
- “…a person being able to do certain basic things. The ability to move about…the ability to meet one’s nutritional requirements, the wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered, the power to participate in the social life of the community” (1979 p. 218).
- “A person’s capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to value…[t]he functionings included can vary from most elementary ones, such as being well-nourished, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to quite complex and sophisticated achievements, such as having self-respect, being able to take part in the life of the community, and so on” (1992, p. 5).
- “…involves judging advantage by the freedom to achieve, incorporating (but going beyond) actual achievements…these conditions can…be fruitfully seen in terms of the capability to function, incorporating (but going beyond) the actual functionings that a person can achieve” (1992 p. 129).
- “Basic capability equality is a partial guide to the part of moral goodness that is associated with the idea of equality” (1979 p. 220).
- Methodology: Two ways to criticize.
- Case-implication critique.
- “…check the implications of the principle by taking up particular cases in which the results of employing that principle can be seen in a rather stark way, and then examine these implications against our intuition” (1979, p. 197).
- Prior-principle critique.
- “…examine the consistency of the principle with another principle that is acknowledged to be more fundamental” (1979, p. 197).
- Case-implication critique.
- Why capabilities?
- Neither utilitarian equality, total utility equality, nor Rawlsian equality “provide a sufficient basis for the equality-aspect of morality” nor do any combination of the three (1979 p. 220).
- Sen’s critique of utilitarianism.
- Ignores the importance of distribution.
- Violates commitments to liberty.
- Human diversity is problematic for the utilitarian principle of equality (i.e. give equal weight to the equal interests of all).
- Equality of total-utility vs. equality of marginal utility.
- Pleasure wizard example (similar to Roemer’s example).
- Sen’s critique of welfarism (total-utility equality).
- Criticisms of leximin.
- Indifferent to “how much” questions.
- Indifferent to “how many” questions.
- Offensive tastes.
- Ignores objective components of well being (“e.g. whether he or she is hungry, cold, oppressed…”) (1979 p. 212).
- Criticisms of leximin.
- Sen’s critique of Rawlsian equality (Question 1- Ben Edeker).
- Sen objects to Rawlsian equality of primary goods on the grounds that it contains “an element of ‘fetishism’” (1979, p. 216). How is Rawls’s view fetishistic? How does equality of basic capabilities avoid this fetishism?
- Urgency.
- Handicap example (1979 pp. 217-218).
- What about equally satisfying needs?
- What’s the view?
- Focal Variables, Spaces, Diversity.
- Sen’s two questions: Why equality? What equality? (Question 2- Kevin Dewan, Kelly Robbins).
- Sen identifies two questions: (I) Why equality? and (II) Equality of what? How are these questions related? Why does Sen claim that “being an egalitarian is not really a ‘uniting feature’”? (1992, p. 14)
- Equality and internal plurality.
- Focal variable can have an internal plurality (e.g. the demand for equality of freedom or capabilities may encompass different types of freedoms or capabilities respectively.
- Human Diversity (Question 3- Gina Schouten, Wes Markofski).
- Human diversity is a central theme in Sen’s discussion of equality. He claims, “The ethics of equality has to take adequate note of our pervasive diversities that affect the relations between the different spaces. The plurality of focal variables can make a great difference precisely because of the diversity of human beings” (1992, p 28). How does human diversity present a challenge for egalitarianism?
- Sen’s two questions: Why equality? What equality? (Question 2- Kevin Dewan, Kelly Robbins).
- The “tension” between equality and liberty.
- Equality vs. Liberty is a faulty way of framing the issue.
- When one asserts that liberty is fundamentally important questions concerning equality immediately arise (e.g. who? How much? How distributed? How equal?).
- Liberty is seen as one possible focal variable for basal equality.
- Tension can emerge between equality and liberty insofar as the equality advocate defends some other focal variable.
- “Liberty is among the possible fields of application of equality and equality is among the possible patterns of distribution of liberty.
- Equality vs. Liberty is a faulty way of framing the issue.
- Does the notion of equality have substantive content?
- General requirement of equality is substantive since it reflects a deep ethical concern for impartiality or “some form of basic concern.”
- Once the variable for equality is fixed, then that variable will have rather clear substantive demands regarding distributive patterns.
- The diversity of spaces does not speak to the notion that “equality” is substantively empty, but rather reflects a deeper diversity with respect to objects of value.
- Plurality, Incompleteness, and Evaluation
- How can we evaluate distributions in terms of “complete” inequality?
- This may be difficulty b/c of (1) the internal plurality of the chosen focal variable; or (2) differences in distance measures even w/ respect to homogeneous variables.
- How can we evaluate distributions in terms of “complete” inequality?
- Capabilities, Efficiency, Aggregation.
- Equality is not the only relevant grounds for assessment, we must also evaluate distributions in light of aggregative considerations.
- Aggregative considerations- generally enhancing individual advantage, regardless of distribution.
- “tend to have an irreducible status” (137).
- Form that aggregative demands take may be shaped by the choice of equality space.
- Distributive considerations- reducing disparities in the distribution.
- Aggregative considerations- generally enhancing individual advantage, regardless of distribution.
- Equality is not the only relevant grounds for assessment, we must also evaluate distributions in light of aggregative considerations.
- Justifying inequality.
- Equality is not the only demand and our judgments concerning social arrangements may be influenced by other considerations.
- How can inequalities be justified?
- Wrong space argument.
- Incentive argument.
- Inequality may be useful in encouraging work, enterprise and investment (142-143).
- Operational asymmetry.
- Inequalities may be justified b/c of the necessity of operational asymmetry (140).
- Attainment vs. shortfall equality?
- Question 4 (Jordon Rogers).
- How does Sen respond to Rawls’s objection “when individuals differ in ‘moral and intellectual capacities and skills’, there is nothing unfair or unjust in people with greater skills occupying influential positions and offices”? (1992, p. 145)
- Rawls’ open procedure may be justified, unless other procedures are more efficient (147).
- Inequalities may be justified b/c of the necessity of operational asymmetry (140).
- Capabilities and Responsibility.
- Focus on freedom to achieve rather than on actual achievements.
- Capabilities, Freedom, and Well-Being(Question 5- Jeffrey Paller).
- Sen claims, “The ‘capability approach’ has something to offer both to the evaluation of well-being and to the assessment of freedom” (1992, p. 150). What does the capabilities approach have to offer with respect to well-being and freedom?